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Beyond the Model Rules: The Place of Examples in
Legal Ethics
HEIDI LI FELDMAN*
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct defined the agenda for the post-
Watergate renaissance in legal ethics. While there had been some form of
codified precepts for American lawyers since at least 1908,' Watergate inspired a
desire to clean up a disgraced profession. The American Bar Association (ABA)
promulgated the Model Rules; law schools instituted mandatory courses;2 and
scholars debated and analyzed the new Model Rules. The organized bar devoted
much time and attention to developing these guidelines.3 The mainstream media
covered both the bar's original efforts and the subsequent adoption of the Model
Rules by particular jurisdictions. 4 Today, forty-three American jurisdictions have
adopted ethics guidelines based closely on the Model Rules.5
Lawyers who violate the Model Rules can lose their license to practice, among
other sanctions.6 While critics question the ability and motivation of state bar
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., Brown University, 1986; J.D.
University of Michigan Law School, 1990; Ph.D. (philosophy), University of Michigan, 1993. The author
thanks Michael Seidman for helpful conversation about examples and a number of the issues discussed in this
foreword.
I. In 1908, the American Bar Association adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics. In 1969, the ABA
replaced the Canons with the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which was in turn supplanted by the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983. For helpful discussion of history of these shifts, see Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1249-60 (1991).
2. In 1983, the ABA required, as a condition of accreditation, that law schools include mandatory instruction
in professional responsibility in their curricula. APPROvAL OF LAW SCHOOLS: AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE, STANDARD 302(a)(iv).
3. See Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model
Rules,.46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 243 (1985) ("The legal profession... recently endured a six year debate over rules
it would adopt to describe the professionally responsible conduct of its members."); Leslie Griffin, Dirty Hands,
8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 219, 235 (1995) (discussing the Kutak Commission, the ABA taskforce that drafted
proposed rules, held public hearings on them, and eventually wrote the final version of the Model Rules);
Hazard, supra note 1, at 1251 (describing the drafts and debates that preceded the ABA's adoption of the Model
Rules and calling the process "controversial throughout").
4. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Lawyers Vote Against Disclosure of Fraudulent Activities by Clients, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 1983, at Al, col. 2; George Bentley, Proposed Lawyers Code Includes New Provision on Informing
Clients. Revised "Model Rules of Professional Conduct" to be Considered, ARK. GAzETrE, Aug. 18, 1985, at
1 B; Charles Mount, Lawyers Council Urges Stricter Ethics Code, Cm. TRm., Dec. 9, 1987, at 4.
5. Robert F. Drinan, Joke's on Us-But Shouldn't Be, 84-May A.B.A. J. 112 (1998).
6. See generally Thomas D. Morgan, Sanctions and Remedies forAttomey Misconduct, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 343
(1995). Morgan groups attorney sanction into three categories: those imposed by public authorities, such
professional discipline and criminal liability; those initiated by clients seeking private remedies, such as legal
malpractice judgments; and those sought by third-parties affected by lawyer misconduct, such as injunctions
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disciplinary authorities to enforce these sanctions effectively,7 their existence
certainly affects the teaching of professional responsibility in law schools.
Professional responsibility teachers quite rightly want to make sure their students
understand the Model Rules and the consequences that may attach to breaking
them.
The need to understand the rules prompted scholarly analysis of their proper
scope and application. In the late 1980s and very early 1990s, much legal ethics
scholarship focused directly on the Model Rules. Some articles concentrated on
particular Model Rules.8 Other works evaluated possible resolutions of particular
issues under the Model Rules as a whole. 9 Scholars also considered whether the
Model Rules resolved specific issues clearly or satisfactorily.'O
Alongside this scrutiny of the Model Rules themselves came a wave of
scholarly attention to the more general principles that seem to animate the Model
Rules. In 1988, David Luban published Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study, "
incorporating and elaborating his landmark article, The Adversary System Ex-
cuse.12 In these works, Luban attacked the principle of zealous advocacy, a
against attorneys acting wrongfully on behalf of clients with interests adverse to the third party complainant. Id.
at 344.
7. George L. Hampton IV, Toward an Expanded Use of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 4 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHIcs 655,656-58 (1991); see Deborah Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE
L.J. 491, 546-51 (1985) (criticizing bar disciplinary committees for using a double standard for entry to the bar
versus disbarment). As Hampton notes,, the ABA itself strongly criticized bar disciplinary efforts as early as
1970. Hampton, supra. ABA Special Comm. On Evaluation of Discplinary Enforcement, Problems and
Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement (1970). Eventually, the ABA issued specific recommendations
for improving bar disciplinary procedures. ABA Joint Comm. On Discipline, ABA Standards for Lawyer
Discipline and Disability Proceedings (1979). Concern about the diligence of disciplinary enforcement has been
expressed in the popular press also. Editorial, Confused About Attorney Ethics, PHOENIX GAzETTE, December
18, 1989.
8. See, e.g., Kevin M. Smith, Model Rule 4.2: Ethical Restrictions on Communications with Former
Employees, 9/22/89 Employee Rel. L.J. 239252; Stephen Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c) Gives the Wrong Answer
to the Question of Corporate Counsel Disclosure, I GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 289 (1987); Joel H. Swift, Model
Rule 3.6: An Unconstitutional Regulation of Defense Attorney Trial Publicity, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1003 (1984);
Note, Model Rule 2.2 and Divorce Mediation: Ethics Guidelines or Ethics Gap, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 223 (1987);
Richard A. McKinney, Proposed Model Rule 1.6: Its Effect on a Lawyer's Moral and Ethical Decisions With
Regard to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 561 (1983).
9. See, e.g., Nathan M. Crystal, Disqualification of Counselfor Unrelated Matter Conflicts of Interest, 4 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHics 273 (1990); Bruce A. Green, Her Brother's Keeper: The Prosecutor's Responsibility When
Defense Counsel Has a Potential Conflict of Interest, 16 AM. J. CRim. L. 323 (1989); Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney
Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Acquisitions, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 579 (1988); Stephen E. Kalish, The Sale of a
Law Practice: The Model Rules of Professional Conduct Point in a New Direction, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 471
(1985).
10. See, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg & Timothy U. Sharpe, Attorney Conflicts of Interest: The Need for a Coherent
Framework, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1990); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV.
351 (1989); Joel C. Dobris, Ethical Problemsfor Lawyers Upon Trust Terminations: Conflicts of Interest, 38 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1983).
11. David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (1989).
12. David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS'
ETHics (David Luban ed. 1983). Luban provides an excellent history of an earlier stage in the legal ethics
literature than the period I am discussing in this Foreward in David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics,
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principle that appears to underlie some of the more extreme Model Rules, such as
the almost complete prohibition on revealing client confidences 13 and the fairly
stringent safeguards against conflicts of interest that could blunt a lawyer's
dedication to any single client.' 4 Others joined Luban's fierce attack on the
adversary ethic. 15 At the same time, some scholars, such as Monroe Freedman,
ardently defended the zealous advocacy principle and worried that the Model
Rules infringed it.' 6 Others, following Charles Fried,' 7 endorsed the ideal of
loyalty they perceived latent in zealous representation.' 8 Gradually, scholarship
advocating alternatives to the ideal of zealous advocacy emerged. Some thinkers
advocated the primacy of the lawyer's obligations as an officer of the court.' 9
Others emphasized the personal and professional qualities important to problem-
solving or mediation.2°
This batch of legal ethics scholarship took a step back from the Model Rules,
exploring principles and values that seem relevant to lawyers and their work. But
this body of work sprang from debate over the zealous advocacy principle, and
the status of the zealous advocacy principle implicates the legitimacy of the
51 STAN. L. REv. 1, 4-7 (forthcoming) (surveying the major philosophical works in legal ethics published in the
1970s).
13. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 (regarding confidentiality of information).
14. MODEL RuLES Rule 1.7 (stating the general rule conflict of interest).
15. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REv. 697
(1988).
16. Monroe H. Freedman, Are the Model Rules Unconstitutional, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685 (1981) (arguing
that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution protect zealous advocacy as part of the adversary
system of justice); Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41 EMORY L.J.
467 (1992) ("In its simplest terms, an adversary system is one in which disputes are resolved by having the
parties present their conflicting views of fact and law before an impartial and relatively passive judge and/or
jury, who decides which side wins what. In the United States, however, the phrase 'adversary system' is
synonymous with the American system for the administration of justice, as that system has been incorporated
into the Constitution and elaborated by the Supreme Court for two centuries.") See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role
of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer
of the Court, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 65 (1995) (arguing that even when representing mentally impaired criminal
defendants, defense lawyers should give great weight to the duty of zealous representation rather than undue
weight to their duties as officer of the court)
17. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE
L.J. 1060 (1976) (justifying the role of zealous advocacy as a form of loyalty).
18. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, I GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHIcs 15, 21 (1986) (noting and basically endorsing the idea of a lawyer as a friend); Stephen Ellman, Lawyers
and Clients, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 717, 761 (DATE) (claiming a morally important connection between client
autonomy and the instrumentally zealous advocate).
19. Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39 (1989); see Craig Enoch,
Incivility in the Legal System? Maybe It's the Rules, 47 SMU L. REv. 199, 212 (1994) (reiterating the equal
importance of the lawyer as officer of the court compared to lawyer as zealous advocate).
20. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem-Solving,
31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 74 (1984); Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Legal
Profession, 68 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 85, 115-24 (1994) (urging that lawyers be trained in how to avoid litigation by
exercising good counseling skills).
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Model Rules approach to legal ethics. To this extent, much of the scholarly work
in legal ethics has remained tethered to the Model Rules.
Now, The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics presents the following theme
issue, entitled Beyond the Model Rules. I imagine that the editors chose this title
because all the articles and Notes address issues not specifically covered by the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. None of the pieces is about the scope,
application, or interpretation of a particular Model Rule. Nor do any consider
how to resolve an issue or issues according to the Model Rules as a whole. These
authors do not debate the principle of zealous advocacy nor its relationship to the
lawyer as officer of the court. They do not consider zeal in contrast to other traits
arguably more relevant to lawyers outside the litigation setting. Where the
authors do discuss the Model Rules, they cast them in broad perspective, moving
well beyond questions of the content and validity of role-morality.
Professionalism and Expert Witnesses,2' by Steven Lubet, addresses the
conduct of expert witnesses, legal actors not even covered by the Rules.
Enforcement of Settlement Contracts: The Problem of the Attorney Agent,22 by
Grace M. Giesel, argues that agency law rather than ethics rules should govern
challenges to settlements negotiated by attorneys. In The New Casuistry,3 Paul
Tremblay recommends casuistry as a nontheoretical, pragmatic method for
answering ethical questions that arise outside the scope of positive law governing
lawyers. William H. Simon's contribution, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of Quasi-
Categorical Moralism,24 argues that regardless of the mandates of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility - a predecessor of the Model Rules,
retained in a minority of jurisdictions 25 - some lying by lawyers is not only
ethically permissible but is ethically laudatory.
All four student-written pieces grew out of papers written for a seminar in legal
ethics called Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators? that I taught at
Georgetown University Law Center in the spring of 1998. The goal of the
seminar is to have students think about the relationships between skilled
lawyering and the requirements of classical moral theories, such as utilitarianism,
Kantianism, and virtue ethics. At the outset of the course, I asked the students to
acquaint themselves with the Model Rules. In successive weeks, students read
some standard works in utilitarian, Kantian, and virtue theory as well as articles
by contemporary moral philosophers and legal commentators. The contemporary
articles spanned a number of topics, ranging from specialized ideas about the
nature of moral value and morally right action to the current state of the legal
21. Steven Lubet, Professionalism and Expert Witnesses, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs - (1999).
22. Grace Giesel, Enforcement of Settlement Contracts: The Problem of the Attorney Agent, 12 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETIcs - (1999).
23. Paul Tremblay, The New Casuistry, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics -_ (1999).
24. William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of Quasi-Categorical Moralism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics
_ 
S n999).
25. See supra note 5.
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profession to the limits of role-based theories of professional ethics, particularly
those based on the ideal of the zealous advocate. For their seminar assignment,
students had to interview a practicing attorney, and ask the subject to discuss an
ethically complex or troubling professional situation the attorney had encoun-
tered during his or her career. I directed the students to find out what ethical issues
the attorney thought the situation raised, how the attorney did or would have
analyzed those issues at the time, what decisions the attorney made with regard to
the situation or actions she or he took, and whether upon reflection the attorney
would now address any of these questions differently than he or she did at the
time. In their papers, the students were to evaluate their interview attorney's
analysis and treatment of the situation, and then decide and explain whether the
attorney had performed well as a lawyer, and whether he or she had performed
well as an ethical deliberator. I required the students to make these evaluations in
light of at least one of the ethical theories or topics covered in the assigned
reading for the seminar. The students refined this format so that they could raise
and address more specific theses. Four of the seminar students developed their
papers into contributions to this theme issue.
In Decision-Making in the Law: What Constitutes a Good Decision - The
Outcome or the Reasoning Behind It?, 2 6 Stephanie Loomis-Price compares
utilitarian and deontological approaches to one lawyer's ethical dilemma, and
considers whether the attorney's reasoning process, its outcome, or both contrib-
ute to the estimation of her deliberation. In her contribution, Ethical Rules of
Lawyering: An Analysis of Role-based Reasoning from Zealous Advocacy to
Purposivism,27 Shannan E. Higgins compares factors relevant to analysis under
the Model Rules (which she regards as the product of role-based morality) to the
factors relevant to more traditional moral theories. Higgins concludes that an
analysis according to the Model Rules ignores morally important emotional and
practical features of a particular ethical dilemma. Lisa M. Greenwald presents A
Critique of an Ethics Committee with a Deontological Face and a Consequential-
ist Voice: The Quest for Loyalty in the Good Ol' Days.2 8 She argues that firm
ethics committees could create a climate of loyalty among partners and associ-
ates, if these committees committed themselves to deontological, rather than
consequentialist, principles and choices. The fourth Note, Encouraging Unprofes-
sionalism: The Magic Wand of the Patent Infringement Opinion,2 9 does not
explicitly invoke classical moral theory. Instead, Imron T. Aly, argues that patent
26. Stephanie Loomis-Price, Decision-Making in the Law: What Constitutes a Good Decision - The
Outcome or the Reasoning Behind It?, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics - (1999).
27. Shannan Higgins, Ethical Rules of Lawyering: An Analysis of Role-based Reasoning from Zealous
Advocacy to Purposivism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics - (1999).
28. Lisa M. Greenwald, A Critique of an Ethics Committee with a Deontological Face and a Consequential-
ist Voice: The Quest for Loyalty in the Good 01'Days, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETIcs _ (1999).
29. Imron T. Aly, Inviting Unprofessionalism: The Use of Lawyers' Opinions in Patent Infringement Cases,
12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics - (1999).
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lawyers should not mix the roles of advisor and advocate and recommends
changes in substantive patent law that would prevent such mixing.
If the only common trait the theme pieces possessed were the absence of
analysis of specific Model Rules, it might not be especially important to present
or read them as a group. The pieces in this theme issue, however, share another,
quite striking feature. Each one relies on examples, in one form or another, used
in a variety of ways. In the final section of this Foreword, I discuss the example
with which William Simon begins Virtuous Lying. I also discuss Loomis-Price's,
Higgins', and Greenwald's student Notes in that section.
Even though I devote more detailed attention to the examples in Simon's
Article and these three student Notes than I do to those used by other contribu-
tors, every contribution to the theme issue includes examples. Steven Lubet and
Grace Giesel both commence their articles with a sprinkling of abbreviated
examples. In his first paragraph, Lubet writes:
Experts may be retained in commercial cases to interpret complex financial
data, in tort cases to explain the nature of injuries, or in criminal cases to
translate underworld "gang codes" into everyday language. Properly qualified,
an expert can be asked to peer into the past, as when an accident reconstruction-
ist recreates the scene of an automobile collision. Other experts may predict the
future, as when an economist projects the expected life earnings of the
deceased in a wrongful death case.30
In her opening paragraph, Giesel sketches an example of attorney involvement in
settlements.
The representative action of the lawyers very often includes negotiation and
discussion of settlement and intimate involvement in the ultimate settlement
agreement. Typically the attorney for one party states orally or in writing to the
attorney for the other party that the client agrees and that action comprises the
settlement agreement. Often, one or both attorneys inform the relevant court of
the settlement so that trial or other proceedings can be averted. Only later do the
attorneys and the parties develop more formal, detailed, and complete docu-
ments of agreement. 3
Giesel then lists some examples - she calls them "possible scenarios" - of
settlement challenges.
Perhaps a renegade attorney agrees to a settlement on behalf of a client even
though the client gave the attorney explicit instructions not to so act. Perhaps an
attorney in good faith believes the client has authorized a settlement and so the
attorney agrees to the settlement only to discover that the client did not
authorize the action. Perhaps an attorney agrees to a settlement on behalf of the
30. Lubet, supra note 21, at - (citations omitted).
31. Giesel.
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client believing in good faith that the client has authorized the action and in fact
the client has authorized the attorney. The client later has second thoughts and
disputes the agreement. Perhaps the attorney has, in addition, informed the
court of the settlement and the court has relied by taking the matter off the trial
docket.
While Lubet uses case citations for most of his examples, Giesel presents hers as
hypotheticals.
Paul Tremblay does not begin his article on The New Casuistry with an
example. But he does provide one a bit further into the article. Tremblay
constructs an apparently fictitious example of a lawyer engaged in "plain
person" moral deliberation. Tremblay describes an attorney, "Mark," whose
client may lose her welfare benefits for failure to provide appropriate documenta-
tion to the welfare agency. In the course of interviewing the client, the attorney
learns that the documentation problem can be solved easily, but he also learns
from the client other information that, if revealed to the welfare agency, would
disqualify her for aid. Tremblay then has the attorney think out loud for us
readers; Tremblay gives voice to the character's thought processes as he reasons
about how to resolve the dilemma.
Encouraging Unprofessionalism: The Magic Wand of the Patent Infringement
Opinion, by Imron T. Aly opens with a description of the events that gave rise to
Therma-Tru v. Peachtree Doors, Inc.,3 2 a case upholding a jury finding of willful
patent infringement despite the defendant's having obtained an opinion letter
from an attorney recommending that it was legally permissible to proceed with
production and sale of the allegedly infringing product. Aly's Note is the only
contribution to the symposium with a major example drawn directly and
explicitly from case law.
The connections between legal ethics and examples are more opaque than the
ones between legal ethics and Model Rules. The relevance of the Model Rules to
legal ethics is straightforward. The Model Rules are pragmatically relevant to
lawyers, because they form the basis of professional discipline. At a minimum,
the Model Rules - as interpreted by bar disciplinary committees, courts, and
commentators - instruct lawyers how best to act if they want to avoid
professional sanctions. What, in contrast, do examples have to tell lawyers about
how they ought to conduct themselves? How could they have anything to say
about this? How could examples rationally assist us in forming true beliefs and
making correct practical judgments about legal ethics? If, as the pieces collected
here indicate, examples will feature prominently in legal ethics as the field moves
beyond the Model Rules, it seems worthwhile to reflect on the work examples can
and should do for legal ethics, particularly for scholarship in the field. This
Foreword attempts a preliminary study of examples, both to enable readers of the
32. 44 F.3d 988 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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theme issue to think critically about the role of the authors' examples in their
arguments, and to promote more self-conscious use of examples in future work in
legal ethics scholarship.
I. PURPOSES AND KINDS OF EXAMPLES
Examples may facilitate the acquisition of knowledge, either for the example's
author, its reader, or both. I say "may" because questions remain about whether
examples convey knowledge or merely appear to do so. For the moment,
however, let us shelve these worries and instead presume that examples can
further our knowledge. Furthermore, I restrict my attention here to how examples
can rationally advance our knowledge. While I am happy to adopt a very broad
conception of rationality, one that includes a role for our sentiments and
emotions, I do want to distinguish between rational and nonrational acquisition of
beliefs. Beliefs we acquire nonrationally may turn out to be true, but when this
happens, the connection seems to be fortuitous. Whatever the precise relation
between rational acquisition and truth in belief - admittedly, a relation that
remains obscure - the connection is not merely a lucky one. Indeed, the
hallmark of epistemic rationality is a reliable, sensible connection between our
processes of belief formation and the truth of the resulting beliefs.
To appreciate that an example can advance knowledge either rationally or
nonrationally, it helps to focus on rhetorical examples. Rhetorical examples
illustrate an author's more general claim, thereby facilitating the reader's compre-
hension of the author's ideas rather than conveying information about matters
other than the author's meaning. Rhetorical examples can work rationally or
nonrationally. That is, they may appeal to the reader's reason, enabling her to
rationally deduce or infer the meaning or implications of the author's more
general point. Or, they may prompt a gestalt reaction from the reader, whereby
she "gets" the point, although not through a rational process. This second sort of
operation does not concern me here. In the following philosophical catalogue, I
concentrate on philosophical work on investigative examples. Such examples
attempt to provide both author and reader with knowledge of matters that lie
beyond the author's thoughts or meaning. As with rhetorical ones, investigative
examples could function nonrationally, fortuitously sparking true beliefs. But
only examples that function rationally can contribute rationally to true beliefs or
judgments about legal ethics.
True beliefs and judgments may be theoretical or practical: they may concern
the way things are or how we should act. Philosophical inquiry into examples
indicates that they may afford either kind of knowledge. With regard to theoreti-
cal beliefs, some ethicists argue that through reading fiction we may acquire true
beliefs about the quality of a human life. Some also maintain that through
considering fictions we may form true beliefs about the constitution of the social
world and the beliefs, desires, and attitudes of human actors within it. Other
[Vol. 12:409
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philosophers argue that through reading fictions we can gain true beliefs about
the content of concepts, about their meaning. Philosophers of science focus on
examples that yield theoretical knowledge about the non-human material world,
true beliefs about the ontology of the universe and its causal laws.
Philosophers argue that examples teach practical judgment in ethics and in the
application of our concepts. In ethics, philosophers see different kinds of
practical judgments demonstrated by examples. Some claim that fictions instruct
us how to live or what sort of personal qualities we should try to realize. Others
use more pointed examples to establish situational judgments about what we may
or may not do.
This section presents a slightly but not terribly idiosyncratic review of some
philosophical research into the epistemic potential of examples. Rather than a full
accounting of the strengths and weaknesses of each philosophical position, I
sympathetically reconstruct them. The somewhat inchoate philosophical litera-
ture ranges from discussion of the relationship between literature and ethics to the
relationship between thought experiments and science. I regard this entire span as
pertinent to the question of how examples might function in legal ethics: I am
considering examples in the broadest sense of the term. Whether an illustration, a
model, a thought-experiment, or a literary fiction, a work serves as an example if,
despite - and perhaps even because of - its particularity, it suggests, illuminates,
or establishes more general true beliefs or judgments. This epistemic relationship
between the particular and the general defines the class of works under consider-
ation here.
II. SusPICIONS
Not all philosophers trust examples. Two who have expressed skepticism are
Onora O'Neill, a Kantian ethicist who raises doubt about the role for examples in
ethics, and Daniel Dennett, a metaphysician and philosopher of mind who
questions the legitimacy of thought experiments in philosophical discussions of
free will.
In 1986, Onora O'Neill published The Power of Example,33 in which she noted
a two-fold resurgence of examples in ethics after the demise of mid-twentieth
century logical positivism. 34 O'Neill distinguished "Wittgensteinian" moral
philosophy from "problem-centred" (sic) moral philosophy, 35 and argued that
despite the differences in the two camps and the sorts of examples they employed,
both relied too unreflectively on examples. According to O'Neill, neither the
detailed, literary examples preferred by Wittgensteinians nor the public, profes-
sional cases examined in problem-centered ethics can aid practical reasoning
33. 61 Philosophy 5 (1986).
34. Id. at 6.
35. Id.
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unless the examples are accompanied by moral principles or theories.36 This is
because the relevance of an example to our own moral dilemmas is never
transparent: "It is difficult to see how the transition from articulated and
intelligible literary or hypothetical examples to moral decisions is to be made
without the mediation of principles or theories which indicate which sorts of
correspondence between example and actual case are important and which
trivial."' 37 Furthermore, O'Neill worries that both literary and hypothetical
examples can mislead us about the true nature of and challenges to ethical
thought and action. As O'Neill sees it, dense, literary examples and hypothetical
cases drawn from the realms of law, politics, medicine, and so forth prepackage
moral dilemmas for us, rather than confront us with the real world problem of
figuring out whether a situation involves a moral dilemma.38 Even if we realize
that a moral challenge looms in our circumstances, we still mus t ascertain the
appropriate specification of those circumstances for purposes of seeing what is
salient to challenge and its resolution.39 When moral philosophers borrow
situations specified by novelists or professional discourse, they may neglect to
ask whether the novelist or the technical vocabulary highlights what is of genuine
moral significance in the circumstances underlying the example. In other words,
whether generated by a novelist or from a professional context, an example can
exert an unchecked, prejudicial influence on how the moral philosopher and her
audience react to the situtation depicted.
In his 1984 book Elbow Room,'40 Daniel Dennett voiced concern about the
potential for philosophical misleadingness even in examples specifically con-
structed in good faith by philosophers attempting to further philosophical
enquiry.4I Dennett called such examples "intuition pumps. ' '42 He said various
things about them, the upshot of which seems to be a deep ambivalence on his
part as to their value:
Here I want to point to a dangerous philosophical practice that will receive
considerable scrutiny in this book: the deliberate over-simplification of tasks to
be performed by the philosopher's imagination. A popular strategy in philoso-
phy is to construct a certain sort of experiment I call an intuition pump.... [Its]
point is to entrain a family of imaginative reflections in the reader that
ultimately yield not a formal conclusion but a dictate of "intuition." Intuition
pumps are cunningly designed to focus the reader's attention on "the impor-
36. Id. at 8.
37. Id. at 18.
38. Id. at 22.
39. Id. at 22.
40. DANIEL DENNETr, ELBOW RooM (1984).
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id. at 12. Lawyers and legal academics will probably be most familiar with the sort of example Dennett
has in mind through Judith Jarvis Thomson's breakthrough piece on abortion. Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense
ofAbortion, reprinted in RIGHTS, RESTrTmON, AND RISK (William Parest ed. 1986).
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tant" features, and deflect the reader from bogging down in hard-to-follow
details. There is nothing wrong with this in principle.... But intuition pumps
are often abused, though seldom deliberately.
43
Dennett's biggest worry is that intuition pumps over-simplify and thereby cause
us to rush to wrong judgments. He cautions against taking our intuitive reactions
to thought experiments at face value. We need, according to Dennett, to figure out
whether the feature of the example that prompts the intuition occurs or has a close
analogue in the situation the simplified thought experiment is meant to help us
understand. The author of an example aims to have us draw the analogy between
the example and the situation under analysis. We must guard against being
misled.
Unlike O'Neill, however, Dennett does not call for articulated maxims and
principles; he does not worry that examples might illicitly substitute for them.
Dennett's area of philosophy explains why his concerns differ from O'Neill's. In
Elbow Room, Dennett explores metaphysical truths rather than studying how we
ought to act. He does not aspire to learn how we should live. He seeks theoretical
rather than practical knowledge. For O'Neill, the problem with examples is that,
without a set of mediating principles or operating instructions, she cannot see
how they could guide or direct our lives and actions, the central goal of ethical
knowledge, in her view. Dennett's philosophical project does not raise the
question of how examples could possibly directly guide us. Instead, it introduces
the puzzle of how an example could instruct or enable our reasoning about
metaphysical truths, propositions about how things are, rather than directives
about what to do.
III. FICTIONS
Cora Diamond's and Martha Nussbaum's discussions of the relationship
between novels and moral philosophy counter O'Neill's suspicions. Diamond
rejects the claim that practical reason is the central moral philosophical topic -
the conception of moral philosophy adopted by O'Neill. Rather than an exclusive
concern with action, with what we should do, Diamond, following Nussbaum,
argues that equally important to moral philosophy is the question of what a good
human life is.44 She goes on to argue that in order to evaluate human lives we
must have them depicted in great detail. Diamond quotes Iris Murdoch:
When we apprehend and assess other people we do not consider only their
solutions to specificiable practical problems, we consider something more
elusive which may be called their total vision of life, as shown in their mode of
speech or silence, their choice of words, their assessments of others, their
43. Dennett, supra note 40, at 12.
44. Cora Diamond, Having a Rough Story About What Moral Philosophy Is?, in THE REALISTIC SPIRrr 372
(1991).
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conception of their own lives, what they think attractive or praiseworthy, what
they think funny: in short the configurations of their thought which show
continually in their reactions and conversation. These things, which may be
overtly and comprehensibly displayed or inwardly elaborated and guessed at,
constitute what, making different points in the two metaphors, one may call the
texture of a man's being or the nature of his personal vision.45
Through reading (the right sort of) fiction closely we can arrive at judgments
about the worth of different kinds of human life. Perhaps these judgments will be
practical, giving us reason to live one way rather than another, but they need not
be to qualify as knowledgable conclusions. A judgment of the ethical texture of a
literary character's being may be primarily or solely theoretical, expressing
knowledge that a certain life is base or noble, benevolent or mean, even if the
judgment does not in any direct way tell us what to do in any particular
circumstance. Diamond's point is that acquiring this kind of knowledge is a
worthwhile philosophical objective.
Martha Nussbaum argues for a related, but different role for fiction in the
pursuit of ethical knowledge. Throughout much of her work, Nussbaum argues
for the centrality and priority of particulars in ethical life.4 6 She insists that good
ethical deliberation involves responding to very specific, particular features of
people and situations; 47 that it requires imagination and flexibility in response to
these features, demanding from us constant and skilled improvisation.48
According to Nussbaum, novels teach this priority of particularity. Our
encounters with novels yield metaethical lessons, revealing information about the
form and structure our best substantive ethical theories will take, perhaps even
suggesting that in the field of ethics we should not seek theories; at least to the
extent that theories collect general principles and rules and attempt to organize
the world accordingly. Nussbaum's point is that ethical life is not susceptible to
this sort of taxonomy, and if we attempt it we will not gain ethical knowledge.
Nussbaum contrasts the concrete perceptions that novelists depict with the
rules and standing terms traditional moral philosophy elaborates. She draws this
contrast in the course of her discussion of Henry James' novel, The Golden Bowl,
and two of the book's central characters, Maggie and Adam.
[W]ithout the ability to respond to and resourcefully interpret the concrete
particulars of their context, Maggie and Adam could not begin to figure out
which rules and standing commitments are operative here. Situations are all
45. Iris Murdoch, Vision and Choice in Morality, Supplementary Vol. 30 Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 32, 32-33 (1956).
46. See Martha Nussbaum, Non-scientific deliberation, in THE FRAGILIrrY OF GOODNESS 290, 298-306
(contrasting a Platonic vision of a universalistic ethical science with and Aristotelian vision of a particularistic
ethical art).
47. Id. at 303.
48. Martha Nussbaum, Finally Aware and Richly Responsible: Literature and the Moral Imagination, in
LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LrrATuRE 148, 156 (1990).
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highly concrete, and they do not present themselves with duty labels on them.
Without the abilities of perception, duty is blind and therefore powerless.4 9
Nussbaum seems to agree with O'Neill that principles - say, of duty - matter to
practical reason, but she suggests that morally responsible perception does not
depend on knowing or having these principles. Nussbaum deeply distrusts
morality's "standing terms."
It is not just that standing terms need to be rendered more precise in their
application to a concrete text. It is that all by themselves, they might get it all
wrong; they do not suffice to make the difference between right and wrong....
Obtuseness is a moral failing; its opposite can be cultivated. By themselves,
trusted for and in themselves, the standing terms are a recipe for obtuseness. To
respond "at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right
people, with right aim, and in the right way, is what is appropriate and best, and
this is characteristic of excellence.",
50
According to Nussbaum, novels serve a double purpose for ethics. Through
their depictions of certain characters they show us who deliberates ethically well
and who does not. They also provide us with opportunities to flex our talents as
ethical deliberators, because to be an effective reader requires attention to
particularity and detail in the novel.5 '
Another ethicist interested in the relationship between morality and fiction is
Daniel Jacobson. Jacobson does not work in either the Wittgensteinian or
Aristotelian philosophical traditions. Grounded in analytic metaethics and Anglo-
American aesthetics, Jacobson has offered a preliminary sketch of how we might
gain authentic moral knowledge from narrative art. 52 Jacobson considers the
tension between narrative art's status as fiction and claims that it can convey
truths.
If the [narrative artist] makes assertions (whether empirical, phenomenologi-
cal, or normative), then [narrative art] is subject to daunting epistemological
worries. But what other relations might the [narrative artist] stand in to "what
should be" besides assertion?
53
Jacobson persuasively points out that narrative authors are not experts in truth,
nor do they purport to be.54 We have no special reason to assume that what they
tell us, implicitly or explicitly, is true. Nor, as Jacobson also notes, can fictions
49. Id. at 155-56.
50. Nussbaum, "Finely Aware" 156 (quoting Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 1106b21-23).
51. Id. at 162.
52. By "narrative art," Jacobson means to include "nearly all literature and drama, but also much film and
some painting" but not "music or abstract visual art." Daniel Jacobson, Sir Philip Sidney's Dilemma: On the
Ethical Function of Narrative Art, 54 J. AESThiccs & ART CRITICISM 327 (1996).
53. Id. at 332.
54. Id. at 331.
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provide inductive evidence for how the world is or even how actual people's
experience of the nonfictional world actually is.
55
Yet Jacobson maintains that we can learn from narrative art. He advances an
"acquaintance model," according to which "the primary ethical function of
narrative art is to provide imaginative acquaintance with the ethical perspectives
which works of narrative art characteristically trade in, but may or may not
advocate."' 56 Jacobson introduces the idea of an ethical perspective to draw a
very interesting link between the way fictions engage our emotional or sentimen-
tal responses and their ability to show us what it would be to see the world stained
in a particular ethical light.57
Jacobson argues that our emotional responses to fiction are proto-ethical,
because of the intimate - if hard to understand - connection between our
sentiments and how we choose to live.58 Fictions invite us to feel certain ways
about what the fiction depicts, to assume attitudes that are appropriate from the
perspective of the fiction itself. In this way, our emotional responses to fiction are
normative: some responses count as correct according to the perspective pre-
sented. When a fiction elicits these responses, we discover what it is to see the
world from the ethical perspective of that fiction. Jacobson writes, "[1]t is not
primarily propositional knowledge we get from narrative art, but something
better described as a perceptual capacity: knowledge of how things look from an
ethical perspective.", 59 Jacobson does not deny that we may react to the fiction
with emotions others than those invited by it, nor does he deny that these other
reactions themselves may be normative - correct according to another, possibly
rival ethical perspective, perhaps our own. Indeed, Jacobson takes pains to
emphasize the fact of pluralism in ethical perspective in the modem world. He
regards broad acquaintance with ethical perspectives as "a prerequisite of
nondogmatic ethical debate." 60 As Jacobson puts it:
[W]e can choose to be parochial, and direct our ethical arguments only at those
who share our perspective, at the cost of excluding nonbelievers from our
normative discourse and excluding ourselves from theirs. Or we can encourage
them to see things from our perspective and, in fairness, offer as much in return.
Then our narrative art is likely to provide our best hope for influence, and
theirs, our best opportunity for understanding.61
To date, Jacobson has provided only a preliminary sketch of his view of narrative
55. Id. at 330.
56. Id. at 333 (emphasis added).
57. For discussion of the relationship between sentimental or thick concepts, evaluative taxonomies, and
discrete evaluative perspectives, see Heidi Li Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1187,
1197-1212 (1994).
58. Jacobson, supra note 52, at 334.
59. Id. at 334.
60. Id. at 335.
61. Id. at 335.
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art and its place in ethical discourse. But his work provides one of the most
exciting, ambitious, and, I believe, promising visions of the possible relationship
between examples and ethical knowledge.
Ethicists are not the only philosophers to consider the role of literature in
philosophical thought. Like Jacobson, Eileen John, a specialist in metaphysics
and aesthetics, works in the tradition of analytic philosophy. But as a metaphysi-
cian, John investigates the epistemic potential novels hold for advancing our
understanding of all sorts of concepts, not just ethical ones. She concentrates on
the information about conceptual meaning and use that can be gathered through
literary experience, rather than addressing how fiction might shed light on ethical
or political concerns.
John claims that reading fiction can yield conceptual results. Certain fictions
add to our comprehension of the conditions of application for a concept or to our
understanding of basic competence in using the concept.62 Comprehending
fiction can also expand our conceptual knowledge in broader ways, by showing
us that a concept can have a broader or different "domain" or "point" than we
previously thought. By "domain," John refers to the set of concepts among which
a concept operates; by "point," our aim in bringing this set of concepts into play.
63
To illustrate and prove her claims about fiction and conceptual knowledge,
John presents a sensitive, careful reading of Grace Paley's short story Wants.
John's reading simultaneously interprets Paley's text and John's own reaction to
the text. John demonstrates that an exchange between the two main characters in
the story - a woman and her ex-husband - throws into question the concept of
want or wanting. In this exchange, the ex-husband accuses his former wife of
never wanting anything, and much of the story turns on her reaction to this
charge. As John artfully shows, an effort to understand the story calls forth certain
questions. What is the relationship between wanting as desiring and wanting as
lacking? Is it coherent to want the impossible? Can want-as-desire still be
want-as-desire if the want has no motive force for the wanter? Can a user
meaningfully use a charge of not wanting as a criticism of somebody else? If the
story is to make sense, at least some of these questions will require affirmative
answers. And it may come as a surprise to learn, for example, that wanting or not
wanting has evaluative force - that the concept can function to assess some-
body's character - or to discover that the possibility of satisfaction is not a
precondition for the application of the concept.
John does a wonderful job of demonstrating that the story itself forces
questions about the concept of want upon the reader. John shows that to make
sense of the story requires recognizing and resolving at least some of these
questions. Paley's story does not merely spark or spur readers already prone to
62. Eileen John, Reading Fiction and Conceptual Knowledge: Philosophical Thought in Literary Context,
56 J. AEsT'Ircs & ART CRmTICISM 331, 333 (1998).
63. Id. at 336.
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thinking of such questions or readers with such questions already in mind. Rather,
for any reader, comprehending the story will involve comprehending how
wanting can be an admirable trait or not wanting a troubling one; and appreciat-
ing that one can appropriately describe somebody as wanting the impossible.
To appreciate John's success in establishing these claims, one must read her
analysis for oneself. As John notes, part of what she is arguing is that "it is
typically not possible to show how experience with a work of fiction generates
conceptual inquiry without conveying some quite specific features of that
experience." 64 Not only does John rely on an example to substantiate her views
about the how reading fiction can lead us to conceptual knowledge; her own
reading of Paley's Wants is itself an example of the process.
IV. THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS
As with fictions, philosophers use and study thought experiments, another
genre of example. Thought experiments overtly aim to yield general knowledge
by presenting a particular scenario for consideration. The philosopher Judith
Jarvis Thomson crafted the philosophical thought experiments probably most
well known to contemporary non-philosophers.65 In 1971, Thomson published A
Defense of Abortion.66 In that article, Thomson grants that after a very brief
gestational period, a fetus is a person, but denies that this concession settles any
important questions about the fetus' right to life.67 Through a series of thought
experiments, Thomson asks the reader to investigate the conditions under which
one person may withhold her body or her services from another, even if that
means death to the other. Thomson has the reader imagine various situations in
which one's body becomes host to another person's, such as having a world-
famous violinist who suffers kidney failure attached to your body while you are
asleep, so his body can use your kidneys.68 She also asks us to picture a situation
where despite your conscientious efforts to prevent "people-seeds" from entering
your home and taking root, some seeds enter through your fine-meshed screens
and start growing in your living room. 69 Thomson's own thinking through of
these situations leads her to endorse only the most minimal obligation to use
one's body to keep someone else alive. Thomson's thought experiments invite the
reader to reach the same conclusion.
Some might charge that Thomson's thought experiments really belong in
Dennett's category of problematic intuition pumps. Certainly, her experimental
64. Id. at 336.
65. Donald H. Regan made Thomson's work familiar to lawyers and legal in scholars in Donald H. Regan,
Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MicH. L. REv. 1569 (1979).
66. Thomson, supra note 42.
67. Id. at 2.
68. Id. at 2-3, 9.
69. Id. at 12.
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design focuses our attention on certain features that the experimental situations
share with pregnancy rather than others that make the experimental conditions
different. Therefore, even if we reach the same judgment about right to life that
Thomson does, we must be confident that the experimental situation analogizes
to pregnancy in the right way. Thomson certainly appreciates this problem. Each
of her thought experiments demonstrates sensitivity to the need for the right
analogy. Thomson constructs her experiments carefully. Each one isolates and
manipulates different variables. They come in a sequence that allows the
thought-experimenter to build upon reactions to earlier experiments in a system-
atic way. Without a more explicit account of analogical appropriateness, how-
ever, we cannot be positive that our conclusions about the experimental situations
properly correlate to those we should draw about the actual situation under
consideration.7°
Even if we grant that Thomson's experimental design properly parallels
pregnancy, we may still wonder what we actually learn from the results of her
thought experiments. We certainly ascertain some of our intuitions about when
one person must allow her body to sustain somebody else's. The question still
remains, how does knowing these intuitions relate to knowing whether it is right
or wrong to withdraw one's body from somebody whose life depends upon it? I
cannot even attempt an answer to this question within the confines of this
Foreword. Yet noting the question helps distinguish normative thought experi-
ments from the sorts philosophers of science usually consider.
In normative thought experiments, even if we think the experiment elicits valid
intuitions, we still need to decide how these intuitions relate to moral truth or
rightness or to correctness in the application of a concept. For both ethics and
conceptual meaning we need a story about the adjudicative role our intuitions
play. Presumably, this story belongs to a longer one about the complicated
relationship between human interests, needs, and attitudes and the nature of truth
in these areas. Science, in contrast, investigates truths about how the world is,
independently of our interest in, or our attitudes toward, it. We do not expect to
rely on our intuitions as arbiters of human-independent truths. So they play no
adjudicative role in what counts as true or correct scientific judgments.
Yet scientists still use thought experiments. Philosophers of science debate the
precise ingredients for a scientific thought experiment, seeking to distinguish
thought experiments from general counterfactual reasoning and from observa-
tion. Whatever the best final definition, we can divine some key features of
scientific thought experiments through a brief look at a famous one: Galileo's
imagined ball and plane apparatus proving inertia.7 ' The experiment begins with.
70. See Cass Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REv. 741 (1993) (discussing the workings of
analogical reasoning in legal practice).
71. See Roy A. SORENSON, THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS 8-9 (1992) (describing Galileo's experiment in detail).
My description is based heavily on Sorenson's.
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a defined initial set-up involving an imagined physical apparatus. Galileo has us
begin by picturing a ball rolling up and down in a U-shaped track resting on a
level plane in a frictionless world. The Galilean experiment then asks us to
mentally manipulate the apparatus. We fold down one side of the U, notch by
notch, until it lies flat along the plane, extending into infinity. As we lower the
track, we roll the ball from the high side to the low, until the final roll when one
side of the track runs along the plane. Finally, we imaginatively observe the state
of the device to see if it teaches us anything. We see that a ball rolled in the U will
obey the law of equal heights, always reaching the same height from which it
started before reversing course. In our final drop, a ball started from the high side
of the former U will run along the side of the track that now is level. Since it will
never reach the height from which it was initially dropped, it will continue rolling
infinitely. The thought experiment has demonstrated the phenomenon of inertia.
Galileo's experiment shows how scientific thought experiments start from a
defined situation, have the experimenter mentally manipulate a particular vari-
able, and imaginatively observe what happens to the other parts in the set-up.
Both the designer of the thought experiment and others who perform it intend
cognitive results. They mean to construct a scenario that others can use to gain
information about a specific problem that the designer of the experiment also has
in mind.
V. THE CONTRIBUTORS' EXAMPLES
At the outset of this Foreword, I asked what epistemic role there might be for
examples in legal ethics. Now, using the foregoing philosophical catalogue of
examples and their possible functions, I want to examine the epistemic purposes
served by some of the examples presented by the contributors to this theme issue.
Probably because the use of examples in legal ethics has so far received little or
no reflective consideration, the authors all use their examples without stating the
epistemic purpose they intend them to fulfill. Examples can also have epistemic
effects other than those intended by their authors or presenters. So, my survey of
the epistemic functions of the contributors' examples makes no assumptions
about whether the authors themselves intend the functions I identify.
William Simon provides one of the richest examples in the theme issue, in that
the example serves or could serve several functions. Simon introduces Virtuous
Lying with "An Illustration," written in the first person and the first person plural.
He describes a situation involving a legal aid office's representation of a client
having trouble obtaining food stamps from the local welfare office. Simon
himself was working as a lawyer at the legal aid office, and his example depicts
his own conduct in tricking the welfare office director into speaking to him on the
telephone, so that Simon could pressure the director into providing immediate
assistance to the client.
Simon's example emphasizes his own involvement in the situation. Simon
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describes the client walking into "our legal aid office" and steps taken by "our
paralegal."' 72 He reports: "I called the [welfare] office"; 7 3 "I proposed that the
paralegal call the office back" ;74 "1 was thus flushed with pride as I related this
story [about the trick and its success] to my supervisor and disappointed when he
remained impassive as I finished." ' 75 Simon ends his presentation of the example
with some dialogue between himself and the supervisor, with the supervisor
having the last word as he accuses Simon of having violated the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. The supervisor tells Simon, who has not already
appreciated this, that Simon lied, making a false statement of fact, in violation of
the Code.
Simon apparently intends the example to contribute to lawyers' practical
knowledge of how to act. He takes it to show that lawyers should lie to serve
justice, at least sometimes. Interestingly, Simon recounts that when he told a
group of seminar students the illustration, they did not infer this judgment,
instead disputing it. This disagreement pushed Simon to develop the expository
argument in defense of lying that he presents in the remainder of Virtuous Lying.
Simon's experience with the example might seem to vindicate Onora O'Neill's
contention that an example without articulated mediating principles cannot
establish a practical judgment. But just because the seminar students disputed the
judgment Simon takes the illustration to establish does not mean that the example
does not in fact establish the correctness of the judgment. We must distinguish
between the warrant for a judgment an example may provide and an audience's
accurate appreciation of this warrant. If we had a more fully worked out account
of precisely when (if ever) examples directly warrant practical judgments, we
would be able to tell when an example fails and when an audience has failed to
appreciate the example.
When I first read Simon's illustration, however, I anticipated a different
purpose for it than providing warrant for a practical judgment about when
lawyers should lie. It seemed most promising as a vehicle for learning about the
concept lie, much as John uses Paley's short story to investigate the concept want.
Assume that the supervisor's interpretation of the Model Code is correct: the
Code classifies any false statement of fact as a lie. Applying the concept lie to a
proposition carries evaluative and prescriptive consequences: lies are prima facie
morally bad and presumptively ought not to be told. The Code's application of the
concept attaches these consequences to any false statement of fact. But this might
be error. Simon himself did not even experience his deception of the director as
involving a lie, hence Simon's surprise at his own supervisor's reaction. If Simon
is a competent user of the concept, his reaction counts against the Code's use.
72. Simon, supra note 24, at.
73. Id. at
74. Id. at
75. Id. at
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Perhaps the Code simply mistakes the content of lie, incorrectly extending its
application to all false statements of fact, regardless of the context in which a
speaker makes them.
We have reason to wonder how probative either Simon's or his supervisor's
intuitions about lie are. Both may have corrupted intuitions, although tainted by
different influences. The supervisor's intuitions may be overly influenced by the
Model Code, whose use of the concept we mean to question. Simon's own
intuitions may be skewed because he perceives himself as the hero in his example
- he tells us "Getting Food Stamps for somebody who would go hungry without
them is satisfying work, especially when you can do it in 10 minutes. I was thus
flushed with pride as I related this story to my supervisor .... This self-
understanding would disincline him to apply a condemnatory concept like lie to
his conduct.
In general, we should be wary of first-person examples depicting and presented
by the actor himself. The worry becomes especially acute when the example
purports to establish a practical moral judgment or illuminate a moral concept.
For it is precisely in the area of ethics that we have most reason to worry that
considerations of self-love, selfishness, and self-interest bias our outlook on the
world, and therefore our sense of which episodes in our own life accurately
convey ethical knowledge. To put the point in Dennett's terms, first-person
examples presented by an author who aims for our approval or agreement might
easily degenerate into self-serving intuition pumps.
Another, related, caution follows from this one. An author who presents an
example depicting his own conduct must realize that the example may yield
knowledge, but not the knowledge he takes it to reveal. Another reading of
Simon's illustration locates it among those examples that reveal theoretical
knowledge about the quality of a human life. To borrow Iris Murdoch's phrase,
the illustration - both the raw facts and Simon's depiction of them - tell us
about "the texture of a man's being or the nature of his personal vision." While
Simon may intend the example to demonstrate his heroism or cleverness, a reader
may respond to it with other conclusions about Simon's qualities and character.
Three of the student Notes present examples that, like Simon's, potentially
play multiple epistemic roles. Stephanie Loomis-Price's Note, Decision-Making
in the Law, presents a "Statement of Facts" after a very brief introduction. Drawn
from the author's interview with a practicing attorney, this example tells how, on
the eve of trial, a client told the attorney-interviewee facts that, if acknowledged,
would completely undermine the attorney's carefully planned trial strategy. The
example continues by recounting the attorney's thought processes as she consid-
ers the relevant Model Rules and various pragmatic considerations. At this point,
the Note's author, Loomis-Price, suspends her description of the example, but
76. Id. at .
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drops a footnote telling the reader where in the Note he can learn how the
interviewee handled the dilemma. 7 7 Loomis-Price resumes the narrative in the
midst of the interviewee's thought processes at the time the client disclosed the
information to her. Then, Loomis-Price quotes the attorney's reflective analysis
of her own motives as they seemed to the attorney at the time of the interview.
Shannan Higgins also delivers a "Statement of the Facts," in which she
recounts events described to her in an interview with a practicing attorney.
78
After a relatively brief description of the legal situation that gave rise to her
subject's ethical quandary, Higgins devotes a great deal of attention to the
attorney's own characterization of his dilemma and his conduct, including the
attorney's examination of the Model Rules and his retention of outside counsel to
advise him.
After a somewhat detailed introduction to deontology, consequentialism, and a
currently popular perspective on changes in law practice, Lisa Greenwald, the
student author of Critique of an Ethics Committee, presents what she terms a
"case study." 79 Again based on an attorney interview, this comparatively lengthy
example describes the factual circumstances that led a law firm ethics committee
to require one of the firm's partners to withdraw from litigation after opposing
counsel raised the question of a conflict of interest, despite the absence of a
conflict under the Model Rules. Greenwald gives a thick description of all the
elements in this example: the allegedly conflicted partner's history at the relevant
law firms, the various clients' relations with these firms, opposing counsel's
tactical accusation alleging the conflict, the law firm's procedures for avoiding
and resolving conflicts of interest, the ethics committee partner's involvement in
this particular situation, his conversations with the allegedly conflicted partner,
and the ethics partner's own analysis of the situation.
Loomis-Price's, Higgins', and Greenwald's examples arguably yield specific
theoretical insights about particular qualities of the attorneys depicted - the sort
of true beliefs Murdoch and Diamond argue can be gained through careful
reading. But the students' examples also function more ambitiously. They include
depictions of the factual setting in which the attorneys operated; descriptions of
the attorneys' conduct; reports of the attorneys' self-understanding of their
conduct and reasoning; and, in some cases, the students' reactions to or interpre-
tations of the attorneys' conduct and self-understanding. The Note-authors
present each of these layers in rich detail.
These vivid, complex examples are good candidates for the sort of narratives
that portray and communicate ethical perspectives, of the kind discussed by
Jacobson. Although not fictional - an aspect to which I will return shortly -
these examples afford windows into distinctive ethical outlooks. In the context of
77. Loomis-Price, supra note 26, at .
78. Higgins, supra note 27.
79. Greenwald, supra note 28, at .
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a longer description, Loomis-Price's report of a young public defender's reaction
to her client's confession of guilt - a desperate desire to put her hands over her
ears and sing "I can't hear you. I can't hear you"' 80 - communicates to us how
the world looks to this lawyer, which aspects engage which sentiments of hers,
and when she perceives ethical trouble. Likewise, Higgins' analysis isolates three
different attitudinal responses from an attorney confronted with a distraught but
dodgy client. Higgins does not simply describe these responses; she recounts the
attorney's perspective on the events that triggered them, thereby enabling the
reader to vicariously inhabit it. Greenwald achieves a similar result by presenting
two attorneys' perspectives on a situation in which one lawyer saw integrity at
stake, but the other lawyer did not. On the basis of any of these examples, we may
or may not come to endorse or share the outlooks and concomitant sentiments
they elicit and warrant. But each example affords us an epistemic opportunity, by
positioning us to perceive the situations faced by these attorneys as they
themselves did, and thereby enabling us to know their attitudinal responses.
Several features of the students' examples and their role in their larger
arguments suggest that their examples hold special promise of helpfulness in our
efforts to gain knowledge relevant to legal ethics. Because the examples are
drawn from the real world, rather than a fictional one, we can be confident that the
ethical perspectives they deliver actually obtain among lawyers. We need not
worry that we are taking up perspectives that have no place in real professional
life. While we might, on occasion, wish to experimentally try on imaginary
perspectives lawyers might come to have, we have special reason to want to
know the perspectives they currently do occupy. By trying on these perspectives
we can compare lawyers' current ethical perspectives with those of nonlawyers,
in an effort to use each group's outlook to enhance the other's.
Although non-fictional, the students' examples are rich narratives. This wards
off the schematism O'Neill complained about in philosophical examples that
skeletally depict stock situations posing canned moral dilemmas. Higgins' and
Greenwald's examples especially depict situations both more subtle and more
mundane than the usual chestnuts of the professional responsibility curriculum.
The disbursement of escrow funds or the structure of a firm's conflict-of-interest
apparatus are not as dramatic as examples based on cases like Spaulding v.
Zimmerman81 or In re Annani.82 But the ordinariness of the students' examples
ensures relevance to the lives lawyers actually live; their subtlety prevents
cliched, knee-jerk interpretations of the lawyers depicted.
80. Loomis-Price, supra note 26, at
81. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962) (upholding lower court's decision to set aside a
settlement because defense counsel had failed to disclose that plaintiff suffered from life-threatening medical
condition of which plaintiff was unaware).
82. In re Armani, 371 N.Y.S.2d 563 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1975) (awarding attorneys' fees in excess of statutory
limits in case where defense attorney, on grounds of client confidentiality, failed to disclose location of murder
victims' corpses).
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The students' discussion of their examples provides another safeguard against
drawing sloppy conclusions from them. At their best, the student Notes actively
use the examples to reason about legal ethics, rather than immediately deriving
principles or judgments. Greenwald repeatedly reviews and relies upon the
example in her Note as she considers how the law firm's conflict of interest
procedures relate to individual integrity and loyalty between partners. Loomis-
Price interrupts the telling of her example to analyze the lawyer's situation
according to act utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism and a Model Rules-based
deontology; her analysis simultaneously clarifies the dynamics of the lawyer's
situation and the workings of moral deliberation according to these three
approaches. This strategy brings the lawyer's actual process of deliberation, to
which Loomis-Price eventually returns, into sharp relief. Higgins also achieves
double insight, both into the ethical outlook of the attorneys she discusses and
into role-based based moral deliberation, by repeatedly examining each in light
of the other throughout her Note. As the students' reflections move between
example and moral theory, they suggest metaethical lessons, in a process
reminiscent of the one Nussbaum describes with regard to reading Henry James.
The students' use of their examples generate hypotheses about the aptness of
certain moral theories or kinds of moral theory for understanding legal ethics.
Whether or not the students themselves articulate, pursue, or prove such hypoth-
eses, their Notes serve the epistemic function of precipitating them.
Loomis-Price's Note demonstrates how examples in legal ethics might serve as
thought experiments, potentially furnishing both descriptive and normative
results. Recall that Loomis-Price interrupts the presentation of her example
before telling us what the attorney she interviewed did or how the attorney
decided what to do. This invites us to perform a thought-experiment, to predict
what the attorney or we ourselves would do in this situation and, perhaps on the
basis of these predictions, to decide what somebody in that situation ought to do.
Certainly, a thought-experiment that predicts human action rather than events in
the natural world raises complications not present in the scientific thought
experiment. If examples like Loomis-Price's are to function plausibly as predic-
tive thought experiments, they must be developed for this purpose more self-
consciously, situating the experimentor carefully and systematically manipulat-
ing variables to produce persuasive, reliable results.
CONCLUSION
This Foreword introduces the contributions to Beyond the Model Rules. Each
piece makes many arguments and points I have not even mentioned. All can be
read profitably for these, rather than as instances of scholarship that rely on
example. The Foreword also begins an inquiry into the epistemic role or roles for
examples in legal ethics. Notwithstanding my sympathetic reading of and
reliance upon the philosophical work on the epistemic power of examples, both
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that work and the present discussion leave unanswered important questions about
whether and how examples exert epistemic power. Most importantly, we need to
develop standards for when to trust the beliefs and judgments examples yield.
In concluding, I will address one lingering issue, because one of the contribu-
tions to the symposium makes it pressing. In The New Casuistry, Paul Tremblay
advocates a case-based approach to legal ethics. Although there are affinities
between this approach and the role for examples that I have been discussing, the
two projects are importantly different. Tremblay's focuses on the role that
reasoning from cases can play in resolving specific ethical disputes, much as
courts use common law precedents to decide disputes over property, personal
injury, and so forth. Tremblay supports an institutionalized process of case-based
reasoning, which would treat professional responsibility much like any other area
of common-law dispute resolution. Putatively injured parties could bring causes
of action against attorneys on grounds of allegedly improper conduct, and
tribunals would rely on precedent to resolve the dispute. But precedent cases
might serve as vehicles of dispute resolution without serving an epistemic
function. Perhaps a case-based approach to professional responsibility would
operate more effectively if reasoning from precedent does in fact deliver truths, at
least when done rightly. But the connection is not a necessary one. The pragmatic
function need not depend on the epistemic capacity of cases. A case-based
method of policing lawyers might produce more acceptable, more ethical conduct
among attorneys without expanding our knowledge. In short, casuistry could
work, even if it does not deliver truth. If scholarship, however, is to rely on
examples to gain knowledge about legal ethics, scholars must become confident
that examples lead rationally to true beliefs and judgments. This means scholars
will have to probe the difficult questions that remain about how examples could
do this.
[Vol. 12:409
